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IV 
INTRODUCTION 
With appellee Brigham Young University's ("BYU") Brief, this case has become 
much simpler. BYU has now abandoned virtually all its theories advanced below to 
circumvent the requirements of due process of law and hold appellant Tremco Legal 
Solutions, Inc., a Utah corporation, ("Tremco") liable to pay the arbitration award and 
Judgment rendered only against the distinct Utah corporation, SoftSolutions, Inc. 
First, BYU has abandoned res judicata as a basis to hold Tremco liable. Although 
BYU's Brief argues res judicata applies in this case and that Tremco is therefore "bound by" 
the arbitration and confirmation proceedings, BYU provides no argument and no authority 
disputing that, even if res judicata applies the effect of that application is to bind Tremco 
only to the determinations in prior proceedings and res judicata is not a affirmative 
mechanism by which Tremco can be held liable to pay the arbitration award and 1998 
Judgment to which it was not a party.1 Rather, because BYU has never pled nor proven any 
alter ego claim against Tremco, the effect of res judicata is that Tremco is bound by the 
determination that SoftSolutions, Inc. only is liable to BYU. 
Second, BYU has abandoned the 1994 Indemnification Agreement as a basis to hold 
Tremco liable to pay the arbitration award and Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. 
Although BYU argues it is a third-party beneficiary of the 1994 Indemnification Agreement, 
BYU does not dispute that, under the unambiguous language of that agreement, Tremco only 
*See Appellee's Argument, Parts II-IV; see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 
59(5) (1982). 
1 
assumed the future risk that SoftSolutions Technology Corporation ("S.T.C.") — not 
SoftSolutions, Inc. ~ might be held liable to BYU with regard to the DSearch algorithm or 
that that particular future risk has never come to fruition because S.T.C. has never been held 
liable to BYU with regard to DSearch.2 Hence, even if BYU is a third-party beneficiary and 
able to enforce the 1994 Indemnification Agreement, which it is not, the SoftSolutions, Inc. 
judgment does not fall within the scope of the unambiguous terms of that agreement. 
Third, just as it did below, BYU offers no argument on appeal with regard to its 
claims against Tremco for a recoupment of SoftSolutions, Inc.'s assets. Given the 
undisputed facts below that Tremco received no assets from SoftSolutions, Inc. and with no 
argument by BYU, let alone evidence, to the contrary, it was error for Judge Howard to deny 
Tremco's motion for summary judgment on these claims. 
Likewise, with regard to the July 10,2002 Order, BYU makes no argument disputing 
and does not even address the fact that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
enter the July 10, 2002 Order on account of Tremco filing its Notice of Appeal on July 3, 
2002. In addition to its due process problems, the July 10,2002 Order is unquestionably void 
because it modifies both the May 14, 2002 Ruling and the June 13, 2002 Judgment, which 
had already been appealed at the time that Order was entered. Because the July 10, 2002 
Order was entered without subject matter jurisdiction, it is void and must be vacated. 
See Appellee's Argument, Part I. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD DISREGARD BYU'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
BECAUSE IT RELIES UPON MATTERS NOT PART OF THE RECORD 
BELOW, IMPERMISSIBLY RECITES ADVERSE INFERENCES TO 
DEFEND A GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND OTHERWISE 
MISREPRESENTS THE FACTS IN THE RECORD. 
The Court should wholly disregard the Statement of the Case in BYU's Brief. BYU's 
own Brief demonstrates its motion to supplement the record should be denied because it 
seeks to introduce materials that were not before Judge Howard in rendering the May 14, 
2002 Ruling, June 13,2002 Judgment, and July 10,2002 Order, which materials cannot be 
considered on appeal. Moreover, BYU's Statement of the Case improperly recites BYU's 
view of the facts, taking all inferences in its favor, when this is a review of a grant of 
summary judgment that requires all inferences be viewed in the light most favorable to 
Tremco as the non-moving party. Finally, BYU's Statement of the Case misstates the record. 
In an apparent attempt to cloud a very clear record that otherwise demonstrates the error by 
Judge Howard, BYU repeatedly states facts that either have no support in or are directly 
contradicted by the appeal record. 
A. THE COURT SHOULD DENY BYU'S MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
THE APPEAL RECORD AND DISREGARD THOSE PORTIONS OF 
BYU'S BRIEF THAT RELY UPON MATERIALS IN BYU'S 
ADDENDUM THAT ARE NOT PART OF THE APPEAL RECORD. 
Having only "provisionally granted" BYU's motion to supplement the record on 
appeal, the Court should now deny that motion and disregard all parts of BYU's brief that 
rely upon the materials that were not already part of the appeal record. This Court has 
repeatedly stated that u[u]nder simple principles of appellate review, [the Utah Supreme 
3 
Court] cannot consider matters not in the record before the trial court." Reliable Furniture 
Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 14 Utah 2d 169, 170, 380 P.2d 135, 135 
(1963); accord Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163,170 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) ("We will not consider facts on appeal when there is no record the trial judge had 
access to those facts when deciding the motion at issue.").3 
BYU moved to supplement the appeal record claiming twenty-six new exhibits were 
necessary for this Court to determine whether Judge Howard's July 10, 2002 Order was 
rendered non-final by the motions to vacate. BYU's own Brief now demonstrates that 
motion was without merit. BYU's Addendum contains only five of the twenty-six new 
exhibits, two of which are excerpts from separate transcript volumes of a single deposition. 
Moreover, with the exception of a single quote from the July 22,2003 hearing, BYU does not 
use the materials with regard to the threshold issue of whether the July 10,2002 Order was 
rendered non-final. BYU uses the materials instead, almost exclusively, to support the 
3See also Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. DisU 2002 UT 130, f51, 63 P.3d 705 (refusing to 
consider on appeal evidence not before the trial court as not part of the record on appeal); 
Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991) ("We consider 
only the pleadings, depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits 
properly before the trial judge."); Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14 Utah 2d 334, 335, 384 
P.2d 109, 109 (1963) (refusing to consider on appeal deposition transcripts not actually 
viewed by trial court); In re L.M., 2001 UT App 314, 37 P.3d 1188 ("Our policy has long 
been, and continues to be, we 'will not consider new evidence on appeal.5") (citation 
omitted); Robinson v. Tripco Inv., Inc., 2000 UT App 200, | 2 n.l, 21 P.3d 219 (striking 
part of brief referring to deposition testimony not before the trial court); Alford v. Utah 
League of Cities & Towns, 197 P.2d 201, 206 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("In resolving an 
appeal, an appelkite court may not consider depositions which have not been filed with 
the district court.55); English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(presuming depositions filed after the date of summary judgment were not considered 
below and, therefore, could not be considered on appeal). 
4 
merits not just of the July 10, 2002 Order, but also the merits of the May 14, 2002 Ruling 
and June 13, 2002 Judgment. Because none of the exhibits existed or were before Judge 
Howard at the time he entered the May 14,2002 Ruling, June 13,2002 Judgment, or July 10, 
2002 Order, they cannot be considered on the merits of the appeal. 
That BYU's motion is without merit is underscored by what BYU has not relied on in 
its Brief. The papers BYU claimed were most critical to the Court determining whether the 
motions to vacate deprived the July 10, 2002 Order of its finality — BYU's memoranda 
opposing the motions to vacate — are neither cited to nor included in the Addendum to 
BYU's Brief. Indeed, BYU does not include its memorandum opposing Duncan, et al.'s4 
motion to vacate the July 10, 2002 Order, in which BYU took the exact opposite position 
than it does now with this Court and argued Duncan, et al.'s motion to vacate did not state 
any claim under Rules 52(b), 59(a), or 59(e), but rather only under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure.5 
4
 Appellants Lee A. Duncan, Kenneth W. Duncan, Alvin S. Tedjamulia, Julee Associates 
L.C., AST Associates, L.C. and KWD Associates, L.C. are referred to collectively herein 
as "Duncan, et al." 
5
 See BYU's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion Under Rules 52(b), 59(e), and 60(b) 
Filed by Duncan, et al. at 16-17 ("A review of Movants' opening memorandum confirms 
that Movants basis for relief is that the Court's [sic] lacked jurisdiction over the Movants 
and that the [July 10, 2002 Order] violates their due process rights."). A copy of pages 
16-17 are enclosed in the Addendum to this Reply Brief as Exhibit 1. 
5 
B. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT BYU'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
BECAUSE IT FAILS TO RECITE THE FACTS IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE UNDISPUTED FACTS BELOW AND TAKING ALL 
INFERENCES IN FAVOR OF TREMCO AS THE NON-MOVING 
PARTY. 
BYU's Statement of the Case should be rejected because it fails to account for the 
correct procedural posture of this appeal. This is an appeal from summary judgment granted 
in favor of BYU and denied to Tremco. On reviewing the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of BYU, this Court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to Tremco as the non-
moving party. Houghton v. Department of Health, 2002 UT 101,12, 57 P.3d 1067, cert, 
denied, 71 U.S.L.W. 3623 (2003). On reviewing the denial of Tremco's summary judgment 
motion, the Court further views the facts supported by the actual evidence submitted by 
Tremco to Judge Howard that is not placed in dispute by evidence submitted by BYU. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(e) ("When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."); Gerbich v. Numed, 1999 UT 
37, f 13,977 P.2d 1205 (holding plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing genuine dispute 
as to material fact). BYU's Statement of the Case violates this principle and recites the facts 
and all inferences (reasonable or not) based thereon in the light most favorable to sustaining 
the summary judgment for BYU and without regard to the undisputed facts that required 
summary judgment be granted for Tremco. The Statement of the Case must be rejected. 
Moreover, BYU's Statement of the Case begs the question on appeal. Rather than 
6 
reciting the facts as demonstrated by the evidence before Judge Howard in rendering his 
Ruling, Judgment, and Order to determine if they were correct, BYU merely recites facts as 
alleged in its Complaint against Tremco (despite Tremco's denials in its Answer), as well as 
in Judge Howard's Ruling, Judgment, and Order, without regard to whether they were 
supported by any evidence. The issue on appeal, however, is whether Judge Howard's 
rulings and BYTJ's raw allegations were supported by the evidence Judge Howard then had 
before him such that there was no dispute as to any material fact and BYU was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
As a result, BYU's Statement of the Case is, in fact, a "Misstatement" of the Case. As 
just one example, BYU repeatedly asserts that Tremco controlled the arbitration between 
SoftSolutions, Inc. and BYU. Aside from being untrue, that assertion is not an undisputed 
fact, but only an inference adverse to Tremco upon which summary judgment cannot be 
entered against Tremco. The only facts supporting that inference were (1) Tremco had some6 
officers in common with SoftSolutions, Inc. and (2) Tremco wrote the checks that paid the 
legal fees incurred by SoftSolutions, Inc. in the arbitration. (R. 1030-31.) No evidence was 
submitted as to the circumstances regarding such checks, including whether the checks were 
issued pursuant to a loan or other arms-length transaction. Moreover, the only sworn 
testimony before Judge Howard rebutted that Tremco controlled the arbitration because the 
officers in common between Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc. "took part in the arbitration as 
6
 At various times Tremco has had additional officers that were not officers of 
SoftSolutions, Inc. (R. 830.) 
7 
part of winding up [SoftSolutions, Inc.'s] affairs [and] acted only in [their] capacity as 
[SoftSolutions, Inc.'s] officers." (R. 827.) 
C. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT BYU'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
BECAUSE IT PURPORTS TO STATE FACTS THAT ARE FALSE, 
EITHER CONTRARY TO OR UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
BELOW, AND ARE MISLEADING. 
BYU's Statement of the Case should be further disregarded because it recites facts 
that are patently false, that are either unsupported or directly contradicted by the record, and 
that are misleading. Rather than disputing each and every misrepresentation of the record 
(which is impossible within the confines of the twenty-five page limit to this Reply Brief), 
Tremco relies upon the Statement of Facts in its opening Brief, which fairly and accurately 
recited the facts in this case that are actually supported by the appeal record and that bear on 
the merits of this appeal. Nonetheless, to demonstrate BYU's systemic misrepresentation of 
the record, Tremco responds to a few of the many key false statements. 
1. The Arbitration and the 1996 Case Were Brought by BYU Against 
SoftSolutions, Inc. in SoftSolutions, Inc.'s Corporate Name. 
Contrary to BYU's repeated assertions, Tremco did not "cause" SoftSolutions, Inc. to 
do anything with regard to the arbitration or the 1996 Case confirming the award. The 
record is clear that the arbitration was brought by BYU against SoftSolutions, Inc. in 
SoftSolutions, Inc.'s corporate name. (R2000. 42, 52.) This fact was explicitly recognized 
by BYU's counsel in the April 10, 2002 hearing before Judge Howard: 
7
 Appellee's Br., Statement of Facts ffif 19-24. 
8 
SoftSolutions[, Inc.] was an entity that was organized under the laws of Utah 
in 1988, it was dissolved in 1992, and [SoftSolutions, Inc.] was indeed the 
defendant in the action which this Court addressed, and as this Court 
knows this Court made and entered a judgment in favor of BYU against 
SoftSolutions [, Inc.] 
(R. 3943 at 8 (emphasis added).) 
The Court should reject BYU's attempt to blame Tremco for BYU's decision to sue 
SoftSolutions, Inc. when SoftSolutions, Inc. was without assets to satisfy the arbitration 
award and judgment ultimately rendered against it. It was not Tremco that "elected to bring 
the [1996 Case] under the name of SoftSolutions, Inc." as BYU contends. (Appellee's Br., 
Statement of Facts % 24.) Indeed, BYU initiated its own separate action to confirm the 
arbitration award (case number 960400557) and named "SoftSolutions, Inc." as the 
respondent.8 (R. 108-09, 113, 115 (emphasis added).) That BYU prosecuted an arbitration 
and confirmation against only SoftSolutions, Inc., which did not have sufficient assets to 
satisfy the judgment ultimately imposed, and chose not to pursue S.T.C., which likely did, 
cannot be blamed on Tremco. BYU had access to discovery during the arbitration and had 
the ability to discern the full corporate structure between the various legal entities. 
2. The Judgment Against SoftSolutions, Inc., Was Not A Judgment 
Against An "Unincorporated Association" And SoftSolutions, Inc. 
Never Carried On Business After Its 1992 Dissolution. 
It is false for BYU's counsel to assert that the original 1998 Judgment against 
SoftSolutions, Inc., was actually entered against an unincorporated association. By its terms, 
8
 By stipulation, case number 960400557 was consolidated into the 1996 Case. (R. 114-
17.) 
9 
the July 7, 1998 Judgment was rendered against SoftSolutions, Inc. — a Utah corporation — 
and states: "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Brigham 
Young University shall have judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. . . ." (R. 283-84 
(emphases added).) 
3. It is patently false for BYU to assert that Tremco's counsel was also 
counsel to SoftSolutions, Inc.9 
The record is clear that Tremco's counsel, originally Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic, Savage 
& Campbell ("Berman Gaufin"), at all times represented Tremco and only Tremco; Berman 
Gaufin has never been counsel to SoftSolutions, Inc. 
Berman Gaufin entered its appearance on behalf of Tremco, and only Tremco, in the 
2000 Case,10 before that case was consolidated into the 1996 Case, when it filed the Ex 
Parte Motion for Extension of Time to respond to BYU's Complaint against Tremco. 
(R2000. at 179-82.) That motion explicitly stated that Berman Gaufin represented only 
Tremco. (R2000. at 182.) Berman Gaufin filed the Answer and Counterclaim that explicitly 
stated it was made on behalf of only Tremco. (R2000. at 337 ("Defendant Tremco Legal 
Solutions, Inc for itself alone, hereby responds to the Complaint") (emphasis added).) 
At the April 10, 2002 hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, Tremco's 
9
 See Brief of Appellee at 22, Tf 56. 
10
 The first case between SoftSolutions, Inc. and BYU (case number 960400497) is referred to 
herein as the "1996 Case." The second case, initiated by BYU in 2000, to which only BYU 
and Tremco were parties and that was consolidated into the 1996 case (case number 
000400088) is referred to herein as the "2000 Case." 
10 
counsel, Samuel 0. Gaufin, reiterated that he represented only Tremco: 
Your Honor, I don't represent SI [SoftSolutions, Inc.]. I had no involvement 
in this case prior to the involvement of Tremco. The only defendant named in 
this case is Tremco. The individuals, are entitled, if relief is to be sought 
against them as individuals, to have a chance to be named and heard on claims 
that claim fraudulent conveyance. Mr. Call admitted that. 
(R. 3943 at 99.) Berman Gaufin never entered any appearance on behalf of SoftSolutions, 
Inc. in either the 1996 case or the 2000 case. The June 13, 2002 Judgment, July 10, 2002 
Order, and even BYU's brief on this appeal all recognize that Berman Gaufin was counsel 
only to Tremco. (R. 1058, 1150; Appellee's Br. at i, 52 (describing Eric K. Schnibbe, 
formerly with Berman Gaufin, as "Attorneys for Appellant Tremco Consultants, Inc." and 
Earl Jay Peck as "Attorneys for Appellant SoftSolutions, Inc.").) 
The law firm of Nielsen & Senior has always been counsel for SoftSolutions, Inc. 
Nielsen & Senior served as counsel for SoftSolutions, Inc. in the arbitration proceedings and 
continued as counsel for SoftSolutions, Inc. in the 1996 case. (R. 22.) Nielsen & Senior has 
never withdrawn as counsel for SoftSolutions, Inc. 
BYU's incorrect assumption that Berman Gaufin represented SoftSolutions, Inc. stems 
from its own error in moving to consolidate the two cases. Even though Rule 4-107, Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration, which was then in effect, provided that a motion to 
consolidate should be filed and heard by the judge in the lowest-numbered case, i.e., the 1996 
Case (to which SoftSolutions, Inc. was a party), BYU filed the motion in the 2000 Case.11 
11
 BYU apparently did so because at the time the 1996 case was on appeal to this Court 
and therefore not then pending before the Fourth District Court. 
11 
Because SoftSolutions, Inc. was not a party to the 2000 case, Tremco's counsel served 
Tremco's opposition to consolidation upon only BYU. Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1) (requiring 
service of papers "upon each of the parties") (emphasis added). 
4. SoftSolutions, Inc. never assigned to Tremco its separate DSearch 
license. 
For the first time ever in this case, BYU now asserts in its Brief that SoftSolutions, 
Inc. assigned its DSearch license not just to S.T.C, but also to Tremco. That assertion is 
false and absolutely unsupported by anything in the record. The undisputed facts before 
Judge Howard were that SoftSolutions, Inc., long before its dissolution in November 1992, 
assigned its DSearch license under the 1990 Agreement to S.T.C. because S.T.C. was the 
operating company and it was no longer practical to have the intellectual property ownership 
and development split between different corporate entities. (R. 827-28. ) 
BYU has never before contended there was any assignment of SoftSolutions, Inc.'s 
license to Tremco and repeatedly argued below that the assignment was from SoftSolutions, 
Inc. to S.T.C. only. As BYU's counsel stated to Judge Howard in the April 10,2002 hearing, 
"[I]n 1990 the licensing agreement for this [DSJearch algorithm was then made with the 
12
 See, e.R., Appellee's Br., Statement of Facts H 8. 
13
 BYU raised no objection below to the statement in f 11 of the Duncan Affidavit that 
SoftSolutions, Inc. "was formed to hold technology licenses, which it assigned to S.T.C. 
to create and distribute software for use on local area networks in a variety of markets.55 
BYU objected to the statement "[SoftSolutions, Inc.] never assigned its rights under the 
1990 Agreement to Tremco and Tremco never agreed to indemnify [SoftSolutions, Inc.] 
for obligations thereunder55 in j^ 15 of the Duncan Affidavit only on the grounds that 
"Paragraph 15 makes a legal conclusion on whether an assignment of rights occurred 
between two parties.55 (R. 883.) 
12 
Soft Solutions [, Inc.] entity. . . . [T]hen all of the assets of SoftSolutions[, Inc.] were 
transferred . . . to SoftSolutions Technology Corporation." (R. 3943 at 8 (emphasis 
added).) 
5. SoftSlutions, Inc. Never Owned Any Shares Of Stock In 
SoftSolutions Technology Corporation. 
BYU's counsel asserts that SoftSolutions, Inc. owned the stock of S.T.C. that was 
ultimately sold to WordPerfect. That statement is false. The S.T.C. stock was never owned 
by SoftSolutions, Inc. 
On the first day of the deposition relied upon by BYU's counsel,14 when BYU's 
counsel began questioning Mr. Duncan as to the relationship between S.T.C. and 
SoftSolutions, Inc. and Mr. Duncan used the term "parent company," SoftSolutions, Inc.'s 
counsel objected to clarify that Mr. Duncan, a lay person, was using that term differently than 
BYU's counsel and did not equate the term with stock ownership.15 Later in that same 
See Appellee's Br., Statement of Facts f 3. The transcript of the deposition of Kenneth 
W. Duncan is not properly part of the record on appeal because it did not exist at the time 
Judge Howard entered the Ruling, Judgment, or July 10, 2002 Order. Indeed, even if 
there is an appeal in the future from Judge Stott's July 22, 2003 denial of the motions to 
vacate the July 10, 2002 Order, the deposition transcript will not be part of the record on 
that appeal because it was not filed with the district court until August 25, 2003 - more 
than one month after Judge Stott's denial. Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14 Utah 2d 334, 
335, 384 P.2d 109, 109 (1963) (refusing to consider on appeal deposition transcripts not 
actually viewed by trial court); English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 n.l (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (presuming depositions filed after the date of summary judgment were not 
considered below and, therefore, could not be considered on appeal.) 
15
 (R. Supp. 68-69 ("MR. PECK: I'm going to object and see if I can't help with the 
communication. I think that Mr. Duncan is assuming that a parent corporation is one 
thing, and I think you're understanding, which is I believe correct, that a parent 
corporation owns the stock of the company. . . . I'm not sure that he understands that you 
13 
examination, Mr. Duncan explained that he was not a lawyer, had no legal training, and did 
not understand the term "wholly-owned subsidiary" meant that SoftSolutions, Inc. was a 
stockholder of S.T.C. As Mr. Duncan testified: 
Q. [H]as SoftSolutions, Inc., ever owned any share of stock, to your 
knowledge, of SoftSolutions Technology Corporation? 
A. No.16 
Mr. Duncan testified that the statement by BYU's counsel that "SoftSolutions was the 
owner of all the stock of SoftSolutions Technology Corporation" is false. (IdL at 197.) 
6. At the Time Of The Stock Sale, DSearch Was Not An Asset of 
S.T.C, Let Alone S.T.C.'s Only Asset. 
BYU erroneously states that S.T.C.'s only asset at the time its stock was sold to 
17 
WordPerfect was the DSearch license. As Judge Howard acknowledged, by July 1993 — 
six months before the stock sale — DSearch had been removed from all S.T.C.'s software 
"and replaced with a routine available in the public domain." (R2000. 37 (Confirmation 
Ruling).) At the time S.T.C.'s shareholders sold their stock in S.T.C, S.T.C. was a valuable 
going concern business that no longer used DSearch. The purchase price paid by 
WordPerfect represented the value of the company without DSearch. 
mean that the parent owns the stock of the subsidiary.").) 
16
 (Tr. 6/26/2003 Deposition of Kenneth W. Duncan (continued) at 197-98 (enclosed in 
the Addendum to this Reply Brief as Exhibit 2).) 
17
 Appellee's Br., Statement of Facts fflf 3, 12. 
14 
BYU is correct that in conjunction with the stock sale a contingency account of 
approximately $1,000,000 was established and held by Novell in the event Novell, as 
successor to S.T.C., was held liable to BYU.18 Although no evidence was before Judge 
Howard at the time he entered the May 14,2002 Ruling, June 13,2002 Judgment, or July 10, 
2002 Order regarding it, BYU is further correct that the account was closed and the money 
transferred. What BYU fails to disclose, however, is that the money was transferred to 
Novell, not to Kenneth W. Duncan, Alvin S. Tedjamulia, or Lee A. Duncan.19 
7. The July 10,2002 Order Is Not Separate From The June 13,2002 
Judgment. 
BYU's incredible position is that the July 10, 2002 Order was separate from and 
unrelated to the June 13, 2002 Judgment. The record is clear, however, that BYU sought 
the relief provided in the July 10,2002 Order in its Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial 
Summary Judgment; BYU filed a single memorandum supporting that Motion and opposing 
Tremco's motion for summary judgment; on April 10, 2002, Judge Howard held a single 
hearing on all then-pending motions, including B YU's Motion for Declaratory Relief and 
Partial Summary Judgment; Judge Howard issued the single May 14,2002 Ruling resolving 
18
 Appellee's Br., Statement of Facts fflf 17. 
19
 In the Addendum to this Reply Brief as Exhibit 3 is a copy of the February 8, 1996 
letter directing the funds be transferred to Novell. Although the letter was not made part 
of the record below, it most certainly would have been had BYU followed the 
requirements of due process by naming Duncan, et. al as party defendants in a complaint 
and allowing them to assert defenses to their individual liability before executing upon 
their property pursuant to the July 10, 2002 Order. 
20
 Appellee's Br., Statement of Facts 159. 
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all then-pending motions, including BYU's Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial 
Summary Judgment, and directing BYU to prepare an Order carrying out that Ruling; and 
BYU prepared and Judge Howard signed the June 13, 2002 Judgment which explicitly 
granted BYU's Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment. 
If BYU believed the June 13,2002 Judgment that it drafted failed to adequately effect 
Judge Howard's May 14,2002 Ruling, BYU was required to either move within ten days to 
amend that judgment, see Utah R. Civ. P. 59, or file an appeal. BYU failed to do either. 
II. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OF THE APPEALS FROM THE JULY 
10,2002 ORDER BECAUSE THE MOTIONS TO VACATE ARE PROPERLY 
CHARACTERIZED AS MOTIONS UNDER RULE 60(b), WHICH DO NOT 
DEPRIVE AN ORDER OF FINALITY. 
BYU is incorrect in arguing the motions to vacate rendered the July 10, 2002 Order 
non-final. The July 10,2002 Order is not rendered non-final by the filing of the motions to 
vacate by Tremco, SoftSolutions, Inc., and Duncan, et al. Those motions all sought vacatur 
of the July 10,2002 Order because it is void as rendered without subject matter jurisdiction, 
personal jurisdiction, notice, or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 
It is well settled that a motion must be construed according to its substance, not the 
caption given it. Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, JI n.l, 27 P.3d 538 ("As the court of appeals 
notes in its memorandum decision in this matter, although Cecil termed his motion a motion 
to dismiss, 'it is properly considered as a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) [motion for relief from 
void judgment] and we treat it accordingly.5") (citation omitted; alteration in original) 
(plurality opinion); Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C.. 2001 UT 20, ^[9,20 P.3d 388; Grossenv. 
DeWitt 1999 UT App 167, f6, 982 P.2d 581. A motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) for relief 
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from a judgment or order does not render the judgment non-final. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
("A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend 
its operation."); Utah R. App. P. 4(b); Sittnerv. Schriever, 2000 UT45,1flf21-22,2 P.3d 442. 
Motions that do render an order non-final are those brought under Rules 52(b), 59(a), and 
59(e). See Utah R. App. P. 4(b). 
Rules 52(b), 59(a), and 59(e) simply do not apply to the July 10, 2002 Order. Rule 
52(b) does not apply because Rule 52(b) permits a party to move the district court to amend 
its factual findings. In this case there are no factual findings. The May 14, 2002 Ruling, 
June 13, 2002 Judgment against Tremco, and the July 10, 2002 Order were all rendered 
without any trial or evidentiary hearing, but instead pursuant to cross motions for 
summary judgment between Tremco and BYU. All the rulings below have been as a matter 
of law and Judge Howard never heard live testimony from a single witness. Smith v. Four 
Corners Mental Heath Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, ]fl6 n.6, 70 P.3d 904 ("At the summary 
judgment stage, the district court.. . does not resolve any factual disputes"); Buzas Baseball 
Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 946 n.3 (Utah 1996) ("[Findings of fact . . . 
are clearly inappropriate in any grant of summary judgment. By definition, summary 
judgment cannot be granted where there are disputed facts."); Crisman v. Hallows, 2000 UT 
App 104, f 8 n.3, 999 P.2d 1249. Likewise, Rule 59(a) does not apply because Rule 59(a) 
authorizes motions for new trials. Again, there has been no trial. 
In addition, Rule 59(e) does not apply because that rule authorizes a "motion to alter 
or amend the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) (emphasis added). The July 10,2002 Order 
17 
is an order, not a judgment. The motions to vacate filed by Tremco, Duncan, et al. and 
SoftSolutions, Inc. did not ask the district court to do anything with respect to the 1998 
Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. or the June 13, 2002 Judgment against Tremco. The 
motions only asked the district court to vacate the July 10,2002 Order as a void authorization 
for B YU to execute on property owned by non-parties to satisfy those judgments. 
Instead, the motions filed by Tremco, SoftSolutions, Inc., and Duncan, et al. are all in 
substance motions for relief from the July 10,2002 Order under Rule 60(b). A motion that 
seeks relief from an order on the grounds it is void is a motion under Rule 60(b)(4). See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) ("[T]he court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:... (4) the judgment is 
void . . . . " ) • Although the motions referred to Rules 52 and 59, that mere reference is 
irrelevant because their substance sought relief from the void Order under Rule 60(b). 
All the motions here sought to vacate the July 10,2002 Order on the grounds that the 
Order is void as having been rendered without subject matter jurisdiction due to the appeal 
and without personal jurisdiction over Duncan, et al. because Duncan, et al. were never made 
parties to this action, never served with any process to be brought within the jurisdiction of 
the district court, never provided notice of BYU's motions, never provided the July 10,2002 
Order in its proposed form, and never provided an opportunity to be heard on their individual 
liability. Arguments that an order was entered without due process of law are arguments that 
the order is void. World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980) 
("A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering State and is not 
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entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere."); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,250 (1958) 
("With the adoption of [the Fourteenth] Amendment, any judgment purporting to bind the 
person of a defendant over whom the court had not acquired in personam jurisdiction was 
void within the State as well as without."); Pennoyer v. Nefif, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1878); 
Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (stating 
judgment "'is void . . . if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or 
of the parties or if the court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.'") (citation 
omitted). The same is true if an Order was entered without subject matter jurisdiction. See 
Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 579 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Because the subsequent trial was 
conducted without jurisdiction, the court's judgment is without effect."); Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons Co., 817 P.2d 382,385 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (stating judgment "'is void.. 
. if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties or if the 
court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.'") (citation omitted). 
Tremco's Motion to Vacate sought vacatur of the July 10,2002 Order on the grounds 
that it did not "comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, and the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Utah Constitution." 
(R. 1162.) In particular, Tremco argued the Order was entered without jurisdiction because it 
expands relief provided by the May 14, 2002 Ruling and June 13, 2002 Judgment that had 
been appealed to this Court, and that the Order violated due process because it was entered 
the day before expiration of the time provided to Tremco to oppose it by Rule 4-501, Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration, and without service upon SoftSolutions, Inc. or Duncan, et 
19 
al. (R. 1160-61.) Tremco also relied upon the grounds advanced in its memorandum in 
opposition to the July 10, 2002 Order, (R. 1162) which argued the Order should not be 
entered because it purports to make findings regarding SoftSolutions, Inc. and Duncan, et al. 
who were not served any of B YU's moving papers, the district court was without jurisdiction 
to enter it on account of Tremco filing its notice of appeal, and it violates Duncan, et al.'s 
right to due process of law because it purports to adjudicate their right to property without 
them first being brought within the jurisdiction of the district court or being provided any 
opportunity to be heard. (R. 1180-89.) Those grounds sound under Rule 60(b). 
Likewise, Duncan, et al. 's motion to vacate is properly viewed as brought pursuant to 
Rule 60(b)(4). Duncan, et al. sought vacatur of the July 10,2002 Order on the grounds that 
the Order violated their constitutional right to due process of law as authorizing execution 
upon Duncan, et al.'s property even though Duncan, et al. were never named parties in this 
action, were never served a summons, were never served BYU's underlying motions, and 
were never provided an opportunity, meaningful or otherwise, to be heard on their individual 
liability. (R. 1483-88.) Duncan, etal. further joined in the argument that Judge Howard was 
without subject matter jurisdiction to enter the July 10, 2002 Order on account of Tremco 
filing its July 3, 2002 Notice of Appeal. (R. 1488.) 
SoftSolutions, Inc.'s motion also was one under Rule 60(b)(4). In its supporting 
memorandum, SoftSolutions, Inc. explained it sought vacatur of the July 10,2002 Order on 
the grounds that the Order was entered without subject matter jurisdiction on account of 
Tremco's July 3,2002 Notice of Appeal, because BYU made no motion to alter or amend the 
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June 13,2002 Judgment or otherwise comply with the requirements of motion practice, and 
explaining that if provided an opportunity to be heard as due process requires, SoftSolutions, 
Inc. would have valid defenses. (R. 1499-1513.) SoftSolutions, Inc. further joined in 
Tremeo's and Duncan, et al.'s arguments. (R. 1499.) 
All remaining grounds asserted can be viewed as made under Rule 60(b)(6), seeking 
vacatur of the July 10, 2002 Order for "any other reason justifying relief." 
Accordingly, it is clear that the motions to vacate the July 10, 2002 Order were 
motions brought, in substance, under Rule 60(b) because they sought relief from that order 
on the grounds it was void. Because Rule 60(b) motions do not render any Order non-final, 
the July 10, 2002 Order is still at issue on the instant appeal. 
III. IT IS IRRELEVANT WHETHER THE JULY 10, 2002 ORDER WAS 
RENDERED NON-FINAL AS A RESULT OF THE MOTIONS TO VACATE 
BECAUSE THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OF THE APPEAL FROM 
THE MAY 14, 2002 RULING AND JUNE 13, 2002 JUDGMENT, THE 
REVERSAL OF WHICH REQUIRES THE REVERSAL OF THE JULY 10, 
2002 ORDER. 
Even if the July 10, 2002 Order itself was not on appeal, which it is, it is based upon 
the May 14,2002 Ruling and June 13,2002 Judgment which are on appeal. Reversal of the 
May 14, 2002 Ruling and June 13, 2002 Judgment requires reversal of the July 10, 2002 
Order. 
As the July 10,2002 Order recognizes, it was issued pursuant to the motions argued 
April 10, 2002 between Tremco and BYU, at which hearing only Tremco and BYU were 
represented. (R. 1150-51.) Those motions were finally resolved with the May 14, 2002 
Ruling and the June 13, 2002 Judgment against Tremco. (R. 1034-52, 1053-57.) BYU's 
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"unincorporated association" theory of liability was accepted by Judge Howard in the May 
14, 2002 Ruling, (R. 1044-46) and BYU's Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial 
Summary Judgment, wherein BYU sought to pursue proceeds of the sale of S.T.C. stock to 
WordPerfect, was explicitly granted by the June 13, 2002 Judgment. (R. 1056.) 
Accordingly, reversal of the Judgment against Tremco ipso facto reverses the July 10,2002 
Order. 
BYU's own Brief underscores that the July 10, 2002 Order is wrapped up in and 
dependent upon Judge Howard's Ruling against Tremco. Tremco's Brief explained how 
Tremco cannot be held liable for the 1998 Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. under BYU's 
novel "unincorporated association" theory of liability and Rule 17(d), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, because (1) the undisputed facts demonstrated there was, in fact, no partnership or 
unincorporated association of which Tremco was a member, and (2) even assuming such an 
association/partnership, BYU failed to comply with Rule 17(d) because it obtained the 1998 
Judgment against only one member, SoftSolutions, Inc., and not the association itself. In 
response, BYU doesn't even address the Judgment against Tremco, but defends its theory 
with regard to the July 10,2002 Order. If BYU's theory lacks merit with regard to Tremco, it 
certainly lacks merit with regard to the non-parties, Duncan, et al., especially when Duncan, 
et al. have never been provided an opportunity to litigate the issue of whether, in fact, they 
were members of the alleged association. Accordingly, this Court's rejection of BYU's 
theory vis a vis the Judgment against Tremco is a rejection of the theory also with regard to 
the July 10, 2002 Order. 
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Moreover, the Court certainly may address issues that are likely to occur on remand. 
IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D&K Management Inc., 2003 UT 5, PPIO, 73 P.3d 320; 
Kilpatrick v. Wiley. Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, f36, 37 P.3d 1130; Timm v. Dewsnup, 
851 P.2d 1178,1182-83 (Utah 1993). If the Court rejects BYU's unincorporated association 
theory of liability with regard to the Judgment against Tremco but lacks jurisdiction to vacate 
the July 10,2002 Order itself, Duncan, et al. are certain to ask the district court to vacate it in 
light of this Court's Opinion. It is entirely proper for this Court to offer guidance to the 
district court that may ultimately prevent yet another future appeal to this Court. 
IV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT DISREGARD TREMCO'S STATEMENT OF 
FACTS MERELY BECAUSE SOME FACTS ARE BASED UPON THE 
DUNCAN AFFIDAVIT. 
The Court should reject BYU's request to disregard the statement of facts in Tremco's 
Brief in its entirety merely because parts of it recite facts placed before Judge Howard by the 
Duncan Affidavit. First, Tremco's Brief relies upon portions of the affidavit to which BYU 
did not object. When an affidavit submitted for summary judgment motions contains both 
admissible and inadmissible portions, "[t]he court will disregard only the inadmissible 
portions of a challenged affidavit and consider the rest of it." Charles A. Wright, et al., 10B 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2738, at 375 (3rd ed. 1998). 
BYU made no objection to paragraphs 1-3, 8, 10, 18, 19, 20, or 23 of the Duncan 
Affidavit and those paragraphs remained before Judge Howard and are properly before this 
Court. (R. 883-87.) Those paragraphs described the nature of Tremco's business as different 
from S.T.C.'s, that Tremco observed corporate formalities, that Tremco remained a separate 
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corporation from and was never a shareholder of SoftSolutions, Inc., and that Tremco was 
not a shareholder of S.T.C. and did not receive proceeds from the January 1994 sale of S.T.C. 
stock. (R. 824-30.) 
Further, because BYU only objected to small, specific portions of the other paragraphs 
in the Affidavit (R. 883-87.), the remainder of those paragraphs were before Judge Howard 
and are properly before this Court. For example, BYU objected to paragraph 4 of the 
91 
Duncan Affidavit only on the grounds that equating a general manager with a corporate 
officer was a legal conclusion. (R. 884.) Despite that objection, it was still before Judge 
Howard and is before this Court that Tremco did not always have the same officers as 
SoftSolutions, Inc. Likewise, even if BYU was correct that part of paragraph 7 was 
inadmissible because it stated that in the 1980s Tremco did business as "SoftSolutions Legal 
Solutions" which BYU argued impermissibly contradicted the 1988 license agreement that 
provided Tremco had operated "under the dba 'SoftSolutions,' (R. 885) it is still before the 
99 
Court that the name "SoftSolutions" was relinquished to KAL, Inc. in June 1989. Indeed, 
even if Mr. Duncan lacked personal knowledge to state the capacity in which SoftSolutions, 
Inc.'s other officers acted during the arbitration as BYU asserted (R. 884), it is still before the 
Court that Mr. Duncan himself participated in the arbitration only in his capacity as an officer 
91 
Paragraph 4 provided: "Alvin Tedjamulia, Lee Duncan, and I have been officers of 
Tremco since its 1982 incorporation, except for a period in 1994, during which time, Dan 
Oldroyd was the General Manager." (R. 830.) 
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Paragraph 7 provided: "During the late 1980s until June 1989, Tremco did business as 
'SoftSolutions Legal Solutions.' In June 1989, Tremco relinquished the name 
'SoftSolutions' to KAL, Inc., a Utah Corporation formed in 1988. After obtaining the 
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of SoftSolutions, Inc. and did not "represent Tremco's interests in the arbitration." (R. 
827.)23 
Moreover, as described in Tremco's Brief, Judge Howard's ruling striking the 
affidavit was based upon incorrect legal rulings and was thereby an abuse of discretion. That 
ruling should be reversed and this Court may properly consider the affidavit. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and as expressed in Tremco's opening Brief, this Court 
should reverse the June 13,2002 Judgment against Tremco and remand for entry of summary 
judgment in Tremco's favor on BYU's claims. Further, the Court should vacate the July 10, 
2002 Order. 
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2004. 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL &,McCARTHY 
By( nsp A ; v^y/. 
Erib K. Schnibtfe (8463J) V y 
50 South Main Street, iWe 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
name SoftSolutions, KAL, Inc. changed its name to SoftSolutions, Inc." (R. 829.) 
23
 Paragraph 16 provided: "As an officer in the dissolved [SoftSolutions, Inc.], I took part 
in the arbitration as part of winding up [SoftSolutions, Inc.J's corporate affairs. In so 
doing, I and all other officers involved acted only in our capacity as [SoftSolutions, Inc.] 
officers and pursuant to our duty of loyalty to [SoftSolutions, Inc.] At no time did I or 
other officers represent Tremco's interests in the arbitration." (R. 827.) 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a non 
profit entity, 
Judgment Creditor and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC., a dissolved entity, 
Judgment Debtor, and 
TREMCO CONSULTANTS, INC., a/k/a 
Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc., a Utah 
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Judgment Debtor and Defendants. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION UNDER RULES 52(b), 59(e), 
AND 60(b) FILED BY DUNCAN, ET AL. 
Consolidated Case No. 960400497 
Hon. Lynn W. Davis 
Brigham Young University, the judgment creditor in the above-captioned consolidated 
cases, submits this memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the Motion Under 
Rules 52(b), 59(e) and 60(b), (hereinafter "motion to vacate") filed by Ken Duncan, Lee Duncan, 
50. The Court signed and entered its Supplemental Order in favor of BYU on July 10, 
2002. 
51. After the Supplemental Order was issued, Mr. Peck filed his affidavit with this Court 
purportedly on behalf of SoftSolutions suggesting that SoftSolutions had no knowledge of the 
proceedings which were before this Court. (Call Aff U 50.) 
52. Mr. Peck's statements are false (Call Aff. f 51.), and BYU is making written demand 
upon Mr. Peck to withdraw his affidavit and other pleadings which suggest that SoftSolutions 
did not have notice of the proceedings before this Court. 
53. Formal request has also been made upon Mr. Peck to clarify that he was indeed 
served with BYU's motion to consolidate and that he had requested no further pleadings be 
served on him in the consolidated cases. (Call Aff. f 52.) 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
POINT I 
THE MOVANTS HAVE FAILED TO 
STATE A CLAIM FOR RELIEF IN THEIR UNTIMELY MOTION 
A. MOVANTS HAVE FAILED TO STATE A BASIS FOR RELIEF UNDER RULE 54(b). 
Rule 52(b) only allows a party to file a motion no later than 10 days after the entry of 
judgment. Id. Therefore, the Movants7 motion under rule 52(b) is clearly untimely. Moreover, 
the Movants have caused similar motions to be filed by Tremco and SoflSolutions, which they 
exclusively own and control. The Movants have also failed to adequately challenge any specific 
findings or conclusions of law, and have submitted no admissible evidence in support of their 
motion. Therefore, Movants' motion under Rule 52(b) should be denied as a matter of law. 
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B. MOVANTS HAVE FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR UNDER RULE 59(a) 
A motion under Rule 59(a) must be made within 10 days. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(b). The 
motion must set forth (1) irregularity in proceedings, misconduct of a juror, accident or surprise, 
newly discovered evidence, excessive or inadequate damages, insufficiency of evidence or error 
in law. Id. A review of Movants' motion reflects that its primary contention is that the Court 
lacked jurisdiction over non-parties and that this Court's Supplemental Order deprives them of 
due process. While these arguments are addressed below, they do not sustain an untimely basis 
for relief under Rule 59(a). 
C. MOVANTS HAVE FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR UNDER RULE 59(e) 
Rule 59(e) provides that a motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be served not later 
than 10 days after entry of the judgment. Id. This Court's judgment against Tremco was made 
on June 13, 2002 and this Court Supplemental Order was made on July 10, 2002. As such, 
Movants' motion is untimely. Movants' motion also fails to marshal any evidence or present 
any factual or legal basis, which can sustain a motion for a new hearing. Therefore, Movants' 
motion under Rule 59(e) should be denied as a matter of law. 
D. MOVANTS' ALLEGED CLAIMS UNDER RULE 60(b) 
Rule 60(b) allows for relief from a judgment on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, 
excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence or fraud. A review of Movants' opening 
memorandum confirms that Movants basis for relief is that the Court's lacked jurisdiction over 
the Movants and that the Supplement Order violates their due process rights. BYU will address 
each of these issues below. 
17 
P. 17(d) and Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408 expressly limit recovery to the assets or the value 
of the assets received from the judgment debtor. 
CONCLUSION 
For the various reasons set forth above, BYU respectfully requests that the Court deny 
SoftSolutions' motion to vacate. 
DATED this I ^ (lay of August, 2002. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Steven W. Call 
Michael D. Mayfield 
Attorneys for Brigham Young University 
665723 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the f 3 tiay of August, 2002, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BYU'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION UNDER RULES 52(b), 
59(e), AND 60(b) FILED BY DUNCAN, ET AL. was hand delivered, to the following: 
Samuel O. Gaufin 
Eric K. Schnibbe 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Earl Jay Peck 
David B. Hartvigsen 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1019 
Clark R. Nielsen 
576 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
665740 
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Exhibit 2 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHAM YOUNG 
UNIVERSITY, a nonprofit 
entity, 
Judgment Creditor 
and Plaintiff, 
vs . 
SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC., a 
dissolved entity, 
Judgment Debtor, 
and 
TREMCO CONSULTANTS, 
INC., a/k/a Tremco 
Legal Solutions, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, 
and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Judgment Debtor 
and Defendants. 
Volume II of the deposition of KENNETH W. DUNCAN, 
taken by the Judgment Creditor and Plaintiff, at RAY, 
QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 36 South State Street, Suite 1400, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, commencing on June 26, 2003, 
before KAPRICE GUNN, a Certified Shorthand Reporter 
and Notary Public within and for the State of Utah, 
pursuant to Notice. 
Volume II of the 
Deposition of : 
KENNETH W. DUNCAN 
Date: June 26, 2003 
Civil No. 960400497 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
QQ-PY 
APPEARANCES 
For the Judgment 
Creditor and 
Plaintiff: 
Steven W. Call, Esq. 
Michael D. Mayfield, Esq. 
Benjamin J. Kotter, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
For the Judgment 
Debtor and Defendant 
SoftSolutions, Inc. : 
Earl Jay Peck, Esq. 
NIELSEN Sc SENIOR 
60 East South Temple 
Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
For the Judgment 
Debtor and Defendant 
Tremco Consultants: 
Eric K. Schnibbe, Esq. 
BERMAN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
For Kenneth Duncan, 
Alvin Tedjamulia, Lee 
Duncan, KWD Associates, 
AST Associates & 
Julee Associates: 
Clark R. Nielsen, Esq. 
NELSON, CHRISTENSEN & HELSTEN 
68 South Main Street 
Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Also Present: Alvin Tedjamulia 
Kaprice Gunn, CSR, RPR 118 
Q. At any time between its formation -- between 
the formation of SoftSolutions Technology Corporation 
in 1989 and the sale of SoftSolutions Technology 
Corporation to WordPerfect in 1994, was there any 
other entity other than those four that owned the 
shares? 
A. No. 
Q. « If you'll look at what's been marked Exhibit 
No. 1. It is a document entitled "Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Joint Motion 
to Strike Proceedings and Disclose Nature of Ex Parte 
Communications." And it is a memorandum submitted by 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker on behalf of Brigham Young 
University. 
And if you'll look at page 6. And looking 
to the bottom paragraph, four lines up from the 
bottom, do you see the sentence that begins "finally"? 
A. I do. 
Q. And that sentence reads, quote: Finally, 
inasmuch as SoftSolutions was the owner of all the 
stock of SoftSolutions Technology Corporation, STC, 
BYU is entitled to execute upon the proceeds of the 
sale of that asset to WordPerfect." 
Do you understand that -- have I read that 
sentence correctly? 
Kaprice Gunn, CSR, RPR 196 
A. You have read it correctly. 
MR. CALL: I'm sorry, what exhibit are you 
referring to? 
MR. SCHNIBBE: Can we go off? 
(Discussion held off the record.) 
Q. (BY MR. SCHNIBBE) Mr. Duncan, the provision 
in that sentence that reads "SoftSolutions was the 
owner of all the stock of SoftSolutions Technology 
Corporation," is that a true or a false statement? 
MR. CALL: Objection. It's been asked and 
answered. We went over it. We clarified his 
testimony. 
MR. PECK: He hasn't asked or answered it. 
He hasn't asked or --
THE WITNESS: It's false. It's false. 
MR. PECK: He's been asked that --
MR. CALL: Have we not beat that to death? 
MR. PECK: He can ask whatever questions he 
wants. 
THE WITNESS: It's false assuming 
SoftSolutions, which is very vague, means 
SoftSolutions, Inc., then it would be false. 
Q. (BY MR. SCHNIBBE) And has SoftSolutions, 
Inc., ever owned any share of stock, to your 
knowledge, of SoftSolutions Technology Corporation? 
Kaprice Gunn, CSR, RPR 197 
A. No. 
Q. To your knowledge, Mr. Duncan, has Tremco 
ever been a shareholder of SoftSolutions, Inc.? 
A. No. 
Q. Has Tremco ever been a shareholder of 
SoftSolutions Technology Corporation? 
A. No. 
Q. To your knowledge, has Tremco ever received 
any proceeds from the sale of shares of SoftSolutions 
Technology Corporation to WordPerfect in 1994? 
A. No. 
Q. To your knowledge, has Tremco ever been a 
partner or member of a partnership or joint venture to 
which SoftSolutions, Inc., was also a member? 
A. No. 
Q. Same questions with regard to SoftSolutions 
Technology Corporation? 
A. No. 
Q. To your knowledge, has there ever been an 
unincorporated association to which --
MR. CALL: I'm going to object. Look, I'm 
going to object. You're turning this into a 
deposition. None of this was covered in the original 
examination. If you want to reset his deposition next 
week and go and do a full-blown deposition of 
Kaprice Gunn, CSR, RPR 198 
Exhibit 3 
N E L 
1 
February 8, 1996 
Fu st Interstate Bank of Utah 
Attn.; Patrick Vargecko 
66 E 1650 N. 
Pi ovo, Utah 84604 
Dear Patrick , 
Due to some restructuring at Novell Inc., it is necessary to close the SoftSoIutions Technology 
Corporation account (#42016683) with First Interstate Bank. This account came to Novell a.% 
part of a corporate acquisition of SoftSoIutions (Tax ID 87-0477094) and is not being used no>s 
that the two companies have become one 
Please close this account and include any interest that is due in the transaction and transfer the 
balance (approximately $950,000) to Novell Inc. The transfer instructions are: 
First Security Bank 
Salt Lake City 
Novell Inc. 
Acct. #184-00894-19 
ABA # 124-000-012 
1 h;in|, v. MI l.'»i k- ,. I I| l l i Hi I . 
Sincerely, 
Alvin S. Tedjarnulia 
Vice President 
jLee A. Duncan 
Vice President 
O V E l l . (NC 
.'2 CAST 
'00 SOUTH 
•IOVO. UTAH 
4606-6194 
3 1 / 29-7000 
)0^53-1267 
